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I. INTRODUCTION
The statutory and jurisprudential rules governing building restrictions must strike “a balance between individual demands for
the recognition of modifications of property rights to suit individual needs and social demands for the preservation of a relatively
simple system of unencumbered property.”1 The Louisiana Civil
Code defines a “building restriction” as a charge “imposed by the
owner of an immovable in pursuance of a general plan governing
building standards, specified uses, and improvements.”2 The Code
further requires that if there is any “doubt as to the existence, validity or extent of the building restrictions” it must be “resolved in
*
J.D./D.C.L. candidate (May 2020), Paul M. Herbert Law Center, Louisiana State University. The author would like to thank Prof. Olivier Moréteau for
his research suggestions and support throughout the writing of this case note.
1. A. N. Yiannopoulos, Real Rights: Limits of Contractual and Testamentary Freedom, 30 LA. L. REV. 44 (1969).
2. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 775 (2017).
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favor of the unrestricted use of the immoveable.”3 Louisiana jurisprudence has established that building restrictions are to be strictly
construed,4 conflicting with the Revised Statutes, which state that
building restrictions should be liberally construed.5
II. BACKGROUND
In Fashion Plantation Estates Property Owners Association v.
Sims,6 the Sims owned a home in Fashion Plantation Estates Subdivision located in Hahnville, Louisiana. Their property, along with
the rest of the subdivision was subject to the restrictive covenants
included in the St. Charles Parish conveyance records. The Fashion
Plantation Estates Property Owners Association (the “Association”)
was responsible for enforcing the covenants. The original covenant
under paragraph 8 provided that “[p]arking or temporary storage of
boats, campers, etc. will not be permitted in front of any houses.”7
The covenant was amended eleven years later under paragraph 11,
which provides that “[p]arking or temporary storage of boats, campers, recreational vehicles, trailers, etc. will not be permitted in front
of any homes. Also, such items will not be permitted within 100 feet
from the edge of any street unless it is parked behind a six-foot privacy fence or in a garage.”8
In 2004, the Sims purchased a boat and parked it in their driveway, next to the garage door, and in front of a portion of their home.9
On April 7, 2015 the vice president of the Association sent the Sims
an informal notification that they were in violation of paragraph 11
because their boat was parked in front of their property. The Sims
3. Id. at art. 783.
4. Id. See comment (b). See also Cashio v. Shoriak, 481 So. 2d 1013 (La.
1986) (holding that building restrictions should be strictly construed).
5. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1141.4 (2019).
6. Fashion Plantation Estates Property Owners Association v. Sims, 209 So.
3d 384 (2016).
7. St. Charles Con. Rec., Paragraph 8 (1999) (emphasis added).
8. St. Charles Con. Rec., Paragraph 11 (2010) (emphasis added).
9. This portion of their home was the farthest right wall which faced the
street. It included a decorative inlay and was not a main portion of the house.
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were also notified that they had three days to remove the boat from
their property or formal action would be taken. The Sims failed to
remove the boat, and the vice president sent them formal notifications of their alleged violation on April 13, April 15, and May 15,
2015. In these notifications, the Sims were informed that if they continued to remain in violation of paragraph 11, enforcement action
would be taken and a $15.00-a-day fine would be imposed until the
violation was corrected, in addition to costs and attorney’s fees. The
Sims continued to ignore the Association’s requests and on August
5, 2015, the Association filed a petition for a permanent injunction
pursuant to the Louisiana Civil Code10 in the 29th Judicial District
Court, seeking to enjoin the Sims from further violating paragraph
11 of the amended covenants. The Association also sought the payment of the $15.00 daily fine and all costs incurred as a result of the
Association’s enforcement of the covenants, including attorney’s
fees.
The Sims answered the petition on August 17, 2015 and denied
all the claims alleged in the petition. The Sims argued that they were
not subject to the amended covenants on paragraph 11, as they were
improperly amended, and that they were only subject to the original
covenants. The bench trial on the injunction was held on December
4, 2015. At trial, the vice president testified that the Sims’s boat was
parked in front of their home, was only 54 ½ feet from the street,
and was not behind a six-foot privacy fence. Thus, they were in violation of both paragraph 8 of the original covenants and paragraph
11 of the amended covenants. The vice president testified that the
purpose of paragraph 11 was to “maintain the value of the properties” and to look like a subdivision and not a “junkyard.”11 He also
testified that there had been several other instances where boats or

10. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 779 (2017), providing for injunctive relief.
(“Building restrictions may be enforced by mandatory and prohibitory injunctions
without regard to the limitations of Article 3601 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”)
11. Sims, 209 So. 3d at 386.
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trailers had been parked in a similar fashion, but the residents corrected the violation in a reasonable time after notice was given.
However, Mr. Sims described the boat to be parked along the side
of the house, and not in front of it as the vice president suggested.
Both parties submitted post-trial memoranda.
The Sims argued that a legal definition should be applied to the
case, not a literal interpretation of what constitutes the front of the
Sims’ property. The Association argued that the covenants were
properly recorded, the boat was parked in front of the home, and the
Sims violated the covenants.12 On February 4, 2016, the trial court
issued a judgment in favor of the Sims, finding that paragraph 8 of
the original covenants was vague and ambiguous.13 The trial court
held that the covenants did not define “in front of” and did not use
the term “front” in such a way that “in front of” in paragraph 8 could
be interpreted in relation to other provisions of the covenants. The
trial court went on to note that while the Association contended that
the portion of the structure that jutted out past the garage constituted
the “front” of the home, this was likely not the opinion of laymen
who may view the home.14 The trial court found that the placement
of the Sims’s boat on the side of the home and in front of the garage
door did not violate the original 1999 restrictive covenants.
As to Sims’s other issue, the trial court held in their favor that
the paragraph 11 covenants did not apply to them. The court noted
that the 1999 covenants, under paragraph 8, set a term of 25 years
and a specific method for their continuation and modification. The
trial court found that the original covenants were recorded on February 26, 1999 and had not been in effect for the required 25-year
12. Id. The Association argued that the violation was “to the detriment of the
overall scheme of uniformity of planning and development governing the subdivision and to the detriment of the other property owners.”
13. Id. at 388. Due to the vague and ambiguous nature of the covenant, the
trial court noted that the covenant must be interpreted against the developer and
in favor of the property owner.
14. Id. at 386. The trial court supported its finding by the testimony of the
Association vice president, who testified that the covenants were amended in 2010
because several of them were ambiguous and needed explanation.
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term and could not be amended in 2010. The Association appealed
the decision to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Louisiana.
III. DECISION OF THE COURT
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the decision of the
trial court in favor of the Association. The appellate court held that
the trial court erred in the interpretation of the restriction under the
Revised Statutes (La. R.S. 9:1141:4), finding that the vice president’s testimony proved that the purpose and intent of the restriction
was to maintain the value and appearance of the property.15 The
court held that the covenant was not vague or unambiguous, and that
the boat was parked in front of the house in violation of paragraph
8. The Association argued in the second assignment of error that the
trial court erred in finding that paragraph 11 was not effective
against the Sims. The appellate court did not decide whether paragraph 11 was or not effective against the Sims, as the point was moot
in light of their holding on paragraph 8.
The court reversed and remanded the trial court’s judgment back
to the trial court for the issuance of a permanent injunction prohibiting the Sims from parking their boat in violation of paragraph 8.
The trial court was instructed to determine the assessment of fees to
the Sims associated with the enforcement of the covenants by the
Association.
IV. CONFLICTING VIEWS ON BUILDING RESTRICTIONS
The legal nature of building restrictions is not under dispute. They
are “incorporeal immovables and real rights,”16 not simply obligations. They are a restriction on ownership to the detriment of individual owners, to the collective benefit of all other residents of a subdivision. The Civil Code wants them to be regulated “by application of
15. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:1141.4 (2019), provides that “[t]he existence, validity, or extent of a building restriction affecting any association property shall
be liberally construed to give effect to its purpose and intent” (emphasis added).
16. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 777 (2017).
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the rules governing predial servitudes to the extent that their application is compatible with the nature of building restrictions.”17 Strictly
speaking, they do not qualify as predial servitudes: though one may
identify a servient estate, there is no dominant estate.18
There are two views on how to interpret building restrictions.
The Civil Code views them as a charge restricting the use of the
immoveable, and for that reason it prescribes a strict interpretation.
This strict interpretation is meant to be protective of the right of
ownership. The Revised Statutes prescribe a liberal interpretation,
favoring the development of well-regulated subdivisions, protecting
the interests of present and future owners at the cost of a limitation
of their ownership rights. The narrow view of the Code treats building restrictions as real rights, to prevent structures that are immoveable or to prevent any annoying actions by a neighbor. This view
protects the property owner. However, building restrictions go well
beyond imposing a standard of construction, they also regulate how
the individual owners can use the private and public space. This type
of regulation makes the type of interpretation used crucial for determining how property owners can use their own property.
The liberal view of the Revised Statutes was used by the Appellate Court in its construction of the phrase “in front of,” creating a
building restriction on the boat in favor of the Association. This interpretation is protective of the investment of the developers and of
communal living. This view on the building restrictions would allow
for the restrictions to further regulate the acts that homeowners can
do on their private property, to ensure that the standard of communal
living within the subdivision is upheld. Under this broad interpretation of the Revised Statutes, the Sims would be unable to park their
boat on their own private property, as the standards of communal
living should not be subrogated to that of the rights of the private
property owner.
17.
18.

Id.
Id. at art. 646.
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The trial court used the narrow interpretation under article 783,
construing the language in favor of the individual owner and against
the Association. The trial court did so because at the time of the enactment of the original restrictive covenants in 1999, the Louisiana
Condominium Act had not yet been adopted.19 The court saw therefore no reason to apply the new law to be found in the Revised Statutes, and therefore ignored the liberal interpretation that it is promoting. This narrow interpretation under the Code favors the rights
of the property owner more than the Revised Statutes. Under the
Code, building restrictions must always be interpreted in favor of
unrestricted use of the immoveable, but this cannot be taken to the
extreme.20 Individual restrictions must be interpreted to ensure the
furtherance of the general development plan, but must not be too
burdensome upon the individual property owner.21 The conflict between the narrow interpretation promoted by the Code and the liberal interpretation enshrined in the Revised Statutes must be resolved.
V. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE REVISED STATUTES AND THE CODE
The trial court narrowly interpreted the covenant in favor of the
Sims, using article 783 and comment (b) to find the language of the
paragraph 8 covenant language “in front of” to be ambiguous and
vague. The appellate court chose to broadly construe the language

19. Fashion Plantation Estates Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Sims, No. 80, 281 D,
La. Dist. LEXIS 10595, at 5 (La. Dist. Ct. 29th Dist. 2016). Subsequent to the
original covenants, the legislature enacted the Louisiana Homeowners Association Act, and changed the law to use liberal interpretations. However, the trial
court found that because the Association did not offer any evidence that the Revised Statutes would change the interpretation of the ambiguous covenants, the
court decided not to rule on the use of the Revised Statutes.
20. Allen Scott Crigler, Some Observations on Building Restrictions, 41 LA.
L. REV. 1201, 1212 (1981).
21. Id. at 1213. The reasonableness standard allows for a balance to be struck
between the need of the developers to have flexible restrictions to allow for a
certain standard of communal living, against the public policy concerns that individual’s property is not unduly encumbered, allowing them the freedoms of property ownership.
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consistent with the Revised Statutes, holding in favor of the Association. It held that the area where the boat was parked, next to the
garage but in front of the farthest right wall that faced the street, was
in fact in front of the home, therefore, in violation of the covenant.
The provisions of the Revised Statutes, the Louisiana Homeowners Association Act, were introduced in 1999.22 These Revised
Statutes govern building restrictions and homeowners’ associations
in Louisiana. The appellate court used these Revised Statutes to justify its broad interpretation of the building restriction in favor of the
Association. The view under the Revised Statutes to liberally construe building statutes is in direct conflict with article 783, and the
Louisiana jurisprudence has well established that building restrictions are to be strictly construed.23 The statute states specifically
that “[t]he existence, validity, or extent of a building restriction affecting any association property shall be liberally construed to give
effect to its purpose and intent.”24 The Code states that “[d]oubt as
to the existence, validity, or extent of building restrictions is resolved in favor of the unrestricted use of the immoveable.”25 Unrestricted use of the immoveable in this case would favor the trial
court’s narrow interpretation, construing the covenant in favor of the
property owner.
This conflict between the Revised Statutes and the Civil Code
can be resolved by the doctrine of lex specialis derogat legi generali
or specialia generalibus derogant, a maxim of interpretation that
states that the more specific law should be given full effect over the
more general law. The Revised Statutes, tailored specifically to
building restrictions, should prevail over the code articles, enacted
to cover building restrictions in a broader sense. Indeed, article 783
clearly states that the provisions of the Louisiana Homeowners Association Act “shall supersede any and all provisions of this Title in
22.
23.
24.
25.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1141.1 et seq. (2019).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 783 (2017). See comment (b).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1141.4 (2019) (emphasis added).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 783 (2019).
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the event of a conflict.”26 The appellate court was in that sense correct in using the Revised Statutes, following the prioritization established by the Civil Code itself. However, we are facing a true conflict of norms that may not be resolved by the mechanical application of the maxim. Both the lex generalis and the lex specialis give
a “general” rule of interpretation, and these two rules conflict. The
only reason we describe the second one as special law is due to the
Louisiana Homeowners Association Act that is housed in the Revised Statutes. Yet, in essence, both are rules of interpretation and
they are general.
VI. CONCLUSION
Resolving such a conflict may require legislative intervention,
to decide whether the interpretation under the Civil Code, protective
of individual ownership, or the Louisiana Landowners Association
Act, protective of investment and communal living, is to prevail.
Both texts are addressing the very same building restrictions, one in
general terms, and the other with more specific rules, and it does not
make sense to have one promoting restrictive interpretation, while
the other favors liberal interpretation. This conflict may be resolved
merely by removing one of the two provisions, as they are antagonistic.
While the appellate court cannot be blamed for applying a timehonored maxim of the civil law, keeping these conflicting provisions
is a strange way to strike the balance between the individual demands for the recognition of modifications of property rights and
the social demands for the preservation of a system of unencumbered property, which was Professor Yiannopoulos’s concern.

26.

Id. See also Cashio v. Shoriak, 481 So. 2d 1013 (La. 1986).

